During the United States' involvement in the war in Vietnam, the decision by the US Marine Corps to emphasise counterinsurgency operations in coastal areas was the cause of considerable friction between the Marines and the army commanders in Vietnam, who wanted the corps to conduct more conventional operations. This book will examine the background to the Marines' decision and place it in the context of Marine Corps doctrine, infrastructure and logistical capability. For the first time, this book brings together the Marine Corps' background in counterinsurgency and the state of contemporary counterinsurgency theory in the 1960s - combining this with the strategic outlook, role, organisation and logistic capability of the Marine Corps to provide a complete view of its counterinsurgency operations. This book will argue that the US Marine Corps successfully used counterinsurgency as a means to achieve their primary aim in Vietnam - the defence of three major bases in the coastal area in the north of the Republic of Vietnam - and that the corps' decision to emphasise a counterinsurgency approach was driven as much by its background and infrastructure as it was by the view that Vietnam was a 'war for the people'. This book is also an important contribution to the current debate on counterinsurgency, which is now seen by many in the military doctrine arena as a flawed or invalid concept following the perceived failures in Iraq and Afghanistan - largely because it has been conflated with nation-building or democratisation. Recent works on British counterinsurgency have also punctured the myth of counterinsurgency as being a milder form of warfare - with the main effort being the wellbeing of the population - whereas in fact there is still a great deal of violence involved. This book will bring the debate 'back to basics' by providing an historical example of counterinsurgency in its true form: a means of dealing with terrorist or guerrilla warfare at an operational level to achieve a specific aim in a specific area within a specific period of time.

Archaeological evidence for settlement and land use in early medieval Scottish upland landscapes remains largely undiscovered. This study records only the second excavation of one important and distinctive house form, the Pitcarmicktype building, in the hills of north-east Perth and Kinross. Excavation of seven turf buildings at Lair in Glen Shee has confirmed the introduction of Pitcarmick buildings in the early 7th century AD. Clusters of these at Lair, and elsewhere in the hills, are interpreted as integrated, spatially organised farm complexes comprising byre-houses and outbuildings. Their form has more to do with contemporary traditions across the North Sea than with local styles. There is a close link between 7th-century climatic amelioration and their spread across the hills, and it is argued that this was a purposeful re-occupation of a neglected landscape. Pitcarmick buildings were constructed and lived in by precocious, knowledgeable, and prosperous farming communities. Pollen analysis has shown the upland economy to have been arable as well as pastoral, and comparable contemporary economic 'recovery' is suggested from similar analyses across Scotland. The farms at Lair were stable and productive until the 11th century when changes, poorly understood, saw their demise.